Stephen I. Vladeck
Can Congress reclaim a meaningful institutional role in supervising some of the broad national security powers it has delegated to the executive branch? This Essay argues that Congress can do so and explains how an obscure statute—the Calling Forth Act of 1792—provides a roadmap for how it should.
**This Essay is part of a Yale Law Journal Online series called "Summary Judgment," featuring short commentaries on recent Supreme Court cases.**
Dissents are frequently an unreliable guide for assessing the implications of majority opinions. As Judge Friendly once put it, “Often their predictions pa…
The days of the case note—and of student scholarship focusing on current developments in the law more generally—may well be numbered. With the proliferation of “legal development” blogs (for example, SCOTUSblog for the Supreme Court, the venerable How Appealing for appellate litigation, Deci…
114 Yale L.J. 149 (2004)
An important chapter is missing from contemporary debates over the constitutional source of the federal government's emergency power. In focusing on five statutes passed by early Congresses to provide for the calling forth of the militia and the federal armed forces to respon…
113 Yale L.J. 2007 (2004)
Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2003).
In INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court rejected Congress's attempt to foreclose judicial review in various provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform …
A Small Problem of Precedent: 18 U.S.C. 4001(a) and the Detention of U.S. Citizen "Enemy Combatants"
112 Yale L.J. 961 (2003)
In 1971, Congress repealed the Emergency Detention Act, part of the Internal Security Act of 1950, by writing into 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) the provision that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." Ena…