The Yale Law Journal

Joshua C. Macey


Bankruptcy by Another Name

Anthony J. Casey & Joshua C. Macey

A recent essay in this Journal critiques bankruptcy for limiting the litigation system’s ability to promote noneconomic public-policy goals. This Response argues that bankruptcy can and does further these public values, and that it is reasonably easy to tweak bankruptcy law to accommodate these goal…


Open Access, Interoperability, and DTCC’s Unexpected Path to Monopoly

Dan Awrey & Joshua C. Macey

This Article argues that open-access and interoperability requirements helped the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation monopolize U.S. securities clearing and depository markets. DTCC’s path to monopoly offers a cautionary tale for policymakers seeking to use open access and interoperability to c…


Dodd-Frank Is a Pigouvian Regulation

Aaron M. Levine & Joshua C. Macey

Although commentators have criticized Dodd-Frank for not solving the problem of "too big to fail" banks, this Note identifies one promising feature of the law. As a "Pigouvian regulation," Dodd-Frank imposed compliance costs that incentivized banks to divest risky assets while providing regulators t…


Playing Nicely: How Judges Can Improve Dodd-Frank and Foster Interagency Collaboration

Joshua C. Macey

Devised in the aftermath of the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) was enacted to reduce risk, increase transparency, and promote market integrity. Since Dodd-Frank was sig…