The Yale Law Journal

Ian Ayres

Article

Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and "Dominated Funds" in 401(k) Plans

Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis

Notwithstanding ERISA‚Äôs fiduciary requirements, a significant portion of 401(k) plans establish investment menus that predictably lead investors to hold high-cost portfolios. Using data from more than 3,500 401(k) plans with more than $120 billion i…

Essay

Tops, Bottoms, and Versatiles: What Straight Views of Penetrative Preferences Could Mean for Sexuality Claims Under Price Waterhouse

Ian Ayres & Richard Luedeman

This Essay reports the results of a survey experiment that we conducted on over eight hundred heterosexual respondents to compare associational attitudes toward gay men who engage in different types of sexual practices. Specifically, we randomly assigned respondents to hear one…

Article

Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules

Ian Ayres


121 Yale L.J. 2032 (2012)
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Whenever a rule is contractible, the law must establish separate rules governing how private parties can contract around the default legal treatment. To date, contract theorists have not developed satisfying theories for how to set “altering rules,” the rules that establish…

Essay

To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping

Ian Ayres, Fredrick E. Vars, & Nasser Zakariya

114 Yale L.J. 1613 (2005)

Many studies have documented seller discrimination against consumers, but this Essay tests and finds that consumers discriminate based on the seller's race.

The authors collected data on more than 1000 taxicab rides in New Haven, Connecticut in 2001. After controlling for a …

Response

Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship

Ian Ayres

112 Yale L.J. 881 (2003)

In sum, Posner has leveled three different criticisms at the modern economic analysis of contracts: a descriptive critique that the scholarship fails to describe or predict the content of current law, a normative critique that the scholarship fails to "provide a solid basis f…

Article

A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in Bankruptcy

Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres

111 Yale L.J. 83 (2001)

This Article proposes a new mechanism for valuing firms in bankruptcy. Under the "senior dilution" mechanism, a court would dilute the reorganized stock issued to senior claimants by issuing additional shares to junior claimants until there was no excess demand for the stock a…