C. Scott Hemphill
This Article examines the mechanisms through which anticompetitive effects may arise when institutional investors hold stakes in competing firms. Most mechanisms, including cartel facilitation and passive failures to encourage competition, either lack empirical evidence or else are contrary to the i…
This Feature examines the antitrust treatment of mergers that harm sellers and demonstrates that lost upstream competition is an actionable harm to the competitive process. Hemphill and Rose contend that harm to sellers in an input market is and should be sufficient to support antitrust liability.
This Feature offers a roadmap for bringing and deciding predatory pricing cases under the Supreme Court’s restrictive Brooke Group framework. Using historical research, Hemphill and Weiser identify flexibility within the framework that permits empirically grounded evaluation of predation claims.
122 Yale L.J. 1182 (2013).
Scholars and courts have long debated whether and when “parallel pricing”—adoption of the same price by every firm in a market—should be considered a violation of antitrust law. But there has been a comparative neglect of the importance of “parallel exclusion”—conduct, enga…