The Yale Law Journal

Aaron S. Edlin


Predatory Pricing: Limiting Brooke Groupe to Monopolies and Sound Implementation of Price-Cost Comparison

Aaron S. Edlin

Responding to C. Scott Hemphill and Philip Weiser’s feature on Brooke Group predatory pricing, Edlin argues that in monopoly cases the greatest competitive danger likely results from above-cost pricing and that the Brooke Group safe harbor for above-cost pricing should not extend to monopolies.


Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing

Aaron S. Edlin

111 Yale L.J. 941 (2002)

This Essay has refocused the predatory pricing debate on ex ante incentives--i.e., the incentives for entry and limit pricing before the predatory period--instead of the traditional focus of high prices after the predatory period. Ideally, a monopoly incumbent should price re…