118 Yale L.J. 186 (2008).
The concept of the author is deemed to be central to copyright law. An important strand of copyright scholarship explores how the development of modern copyright law was intertwined with the rise of a new ideology of authorship as an individualist act of creation ex nihilo. This Article remedies two common shortcomings of this scholarship: implying that the process of embedding original authorship in copyright law was complete by the end of the eighteenth century, and presenting the relation between the ideology of authorship and copyright law as an exact correlation. These two shortcomings neglect the complexity of the interaction between authorship and copyright law and attract the criticism that much of modern copyright doctrine seems diametrically opposed to the presuppositions of original authorship. This Article focuses on copyright law and discourse in nineteenth-century
118 Yale L.J. 272 (2008).
In Anders v. California, the Supreme Court crafted a procedure to prevent appointed attorneys from abandoning their clients after trial. The Court provided that if counsel wishes to withdraw from a “frivolous” case, he or she first must file a brief referring to anything in the record that might support an appeal. Then, before permitting withdrawal, the appellate court examines the brief and the proceedings below to determine whether counsel’s assessment was proper. Since deciding Anders in 1967, the Supreme Court has not determined whether this procedure also applies to appeals from civil commitment. Several recent state court decisions, however, have rejected this possibility. This Note criticizes these decisions on both doctrinal and policy grounds. First, a review of relevant case law suggests that Anders should be viewed as derived from the Fourteenth Amendment rather than from the Sixth Amendment, furnishing a compelling constitutional basis for requiring Anders in both criminal and civil-commitment appeals. Moreover, Anders may have unique utility in furthering the norms of “therapeutic jurisprudence” by alleviating the role dilemma often manifested by civil-commitment attorneys.
118 Yale L.J. 320 (2008).
This Note considers the rising trend of anonymous online harassment and the use of John Doe subpoenas to unmask anonymous speakers. Although anonymity often serves as an important shield for valuable speech, it also protects online harassment that can chill or completely silence the speech of its targets. This Note argues that the public figure doctrine should be adapted to John Doe subpoenas to distinguish between online harassment and more valued anonymous speech. It then divides John Doe subpoena standards into six constituent factors, evaluates each one, and proposes a final standard that consistently balances the needs of plaintiffs and defendants and helps judges to distinguish online harassment from other forms of anonymous speech.